Abstract Privacy protection is one of the most challenging problems of social networks. Simple removal of the labels is unable to protect the privacy of social networks because the information of graph structures can be utilized to deanonymize target nodes. Previous related proposals mostly assume that attacker knows only the target's neighborhood graph, but ignoring of signed edge attribute. The graph structure with signed edge attributes could cause serious privacy leakage of social networks. In this paper, we take the signed attribute of edges into account when achieving k-anonymity privacy protection for social networks. We propose a signed k-anonymity scheme to protect the privacy of key entities in social networks. With signed k-anonymity protection, these targets cannot be re-identified by attackers with confidence higher than 1/k. The proposed scheme minimizes the modification, which preserves high utility of the original data. Extensive experiments on real data sets and synthetic graph illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
Introduction

Background
The idea of social network has become commonplace since the recent rapid development of social networking websites such as Facebook, Twitter and Wechat [1] . The users of these social networks are encouraged to build up connections to others, which results in graph structure based networks [2] . In the graphs, topological structure consists of entities (vertices) and their relationships (edges) where the entities are individual social actors and edges are relationships between social actors [3] . In the era of big data, various kinds of data are outsourced on cloud servers for the third party research. Before publishing data to cloud, the privacy information such as user names and identities are removed from the original social network data. However, it is not enough to protect the privacy of social networks because of de-anonymization by the information of graph structures.
Data anonymity refers to hiding identity and/or associated sensitive data. A simple way to anonymize a social network is to hide the labels of social users in the network. But the relationships are still exposed to the potential attackers because of the graph feature of social network. As a common data structure, graph is widely used to describe social networks, biological networks [4] , and so on [5] . Many technologies are proposed to process graph data [6, 7] . However, the information of graph structure might be utilized by attackers to deanonymize social networks. For example, 86.9-95.5% of the users in Google+ are de-anonymizable, which implies structure based de-anonymization is powerful in practice [8] .
Motivations
Attackers deanonymize social networks based on some background knowledge. Figure 1 illustrates three types of different background knowledge. Figure 1a shows an example of original social network including eight vertices. Zhou and Pei [9] took 1-neighborhood graph into account firstly as shown in Fig. 1b for k-anonymity. With 1-neighborhood graph, attacks know the one-hop neighbors of the target user and their connections. 1*-neighborhood graph was proposed in [10] by extending 1-neighborhood graph. Based on the 1-neighborhood graph, 1*-neighborhood graph adds the information of the degrees of one-hop neighbors, as shown in Fig. 1c . However, the signs of edges are not took into account in previous k-anonymity research. As shown in Fig. 1d , the signs ('+' and '−') of edges are the types of relationship between users such as friend or blacklisted relationship respectively. With the information of signs, Bob's signed 1*-neighborhood graph is shown in Fig. 1d . In this paper, we assume that attackers have the background knowledge about the target user's signed 1*-neighborhood graph.
A variety of anonymization methods have been proposed against graph-structure attacks. K -anonymity is a widely-used privacy preserving technique. Zhou and Pei [9] defined a k-anonymity social network, where an attacker, with the knowledge of a target's 1-neighborhood graph, cannot re-identify the target with confidence higher Attacker's background knowledge. a an original social network with signed links. b 1-neighborhood graph proposed in [9] ; c 1*-neighborhood graph proposed in [10] ; d signed 1*-neighborhood graph than 1/k. The basic idea is to make the vertex's 1-neighborhood graph isomorphic with at least k − 1 other vertices 1-neighborhood graphs by modifying edges. Given k isomorphic 1-neighborhood graphs, each vertex has a probability of 1/k to be selected as the target. For example, in Fig. 2a , attacker can re-identify Bob (the assumed target) from the simple anonymized social network according to its 1-neighborhood graph (Fig. 1a ). To deal with 1-neighborhood attack, Zhou et al. proposed a k-anonymity method in [9] . Figure 2b shows an example result of Bob's 2-anonymity against 1-neighborhood attack, where the attack can not re-identity Bob according to his 1-neighborhood graph again. Recently, 1*-neighborhood attack was presented in [10] . As shown in Fig. 2c , they assume that the attacker knows not only the target's 1-neighborhood graph, but also all neighbors' degrees. Figure 2d shows 2-anonymity result against 1*-neighborhood for Bob by adding three edges. The vast majority of existing k-anonymity algorithms are designed for unsigned social networks. However, social networks could have both positive and negative edges. For example, positive and negative edges could denote trust and distrust relationship, or friend and foe relationship respectively [11] . With the information of signed edges as shown in Fig. 2e , attackers can deanonymize the k-anonymized 1*-neighborhood graph. Therefore, it is urgent to propose new method to deal with signed graph deanonymization attacks on social networks.
Contributions
In this paper, we investigate a novel attack and the corresponding k-anonymity scheme. We deal with the de-anonymity attack that the attackers have not only the 1*-neighborhood graph of target entities, but also the signed links [12] . As shown in Fig. 1a , every link has a sign '+' or '−'. When attackers have the knowledge of signed [9] ; c, d demonstrate the 1*-neighborhood graph attack and protection [10] . e shows a new attack model named signed 1*-neighborhood graph attack, in which attackers have the additional knowledge about signed links 1*-neighborhood graph, the k-anonymized graphs might not be k-anonymity again. For example, in Fig. 2e , attackers can re-identify Bob from the 2-anonymity graph against 1*-neighborhood attack. To deal with signed 1*-neighborhood graph attack, we propose a k-anonymity scheme for signed social networks in this paper. The major contributions of this work are as follows:
-A novel attack model named signed 1*-neighborhood graph attack is presented in this paper. Social links often have sign features such as trust and distrust, which makes the corresponding privacy protection more practical. -Against signed 1*-neighborhood graph attack, we propose a k-anonymity privacy protection scheme. This scheme can provides completely k-anonymity for key entities of social networks. One significant advantage of the proposed scheme is that it preserves privacy as well as maintains high utility. -We conduct extensive experiments on several real data sets and demonstrate the significant effectiveness of the proposed method. The experimental results shows that the utility of original social networks is conserved to a great extent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 shows the proposed kanonymity scheme. It includes the theoretical analysis of the similarity in Sect. 2.1 and the k-anonymity algorithm in Sect. 2.2. Experimental results are provided in Sect. 3. Section 4 presents the related work briefly. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes the paper.
The Proposed k-Anonymity Scheme
In this section, we first present the theoretical analysis of similarity between social vertices, which is the basis of the k-anonymity scheme. Then, the details of k-anonymity scheme for any vertex to be anonymized are presented in the following.
Theoretical Analysis of Similarity Between Social Vertices
In k-anonymity mechanism, the ultimate goal of anonymization is to secure kanonymity, where one target shares identical or similar local structure with k − 1 actors, so that the possibility of finding the target is 1/k. To achieve k-anonymity for a given target vertex, the first step is to find at least k − 1 vertices to anonymize which are named as candidate nodes. In order to minimize the cost of anonymization, these candidate nodes should be as similar as possible to the target vertex. In this section, we analyze the similarity metrics of social vertices to guide the selection of candidate nodes.
Deanonymization methods based on neighborhood utilize the information of the target's neighbor vertices. Therefore, k-anonymity schemes need to find the candidate nodes whose neighbor vertices's degrees sequences are the most similar to that of the target vertex. Therefore, how to measure the similarity between vertex pair is an important task for k-anonymity. We formulate the similarity between vertex pair according to the degrees of their neighbor vertices. Firstly, we consider the neighbor degrees sequences which include only two degrees.
Theorem 1
Given two finite sequences x = (x 1 , x 2 ) and y = (y 1 , y 2 ), x and y are in ascending order. there exists:
Proof Since x and y are symmetrical, without loss of generality, we assume x 2 ≤ y 2 . Then, there are three situations which satisfy the given constraints and assumption, as shown in Fig. 3, (1 
Thus, Theorem 1 is satisfied in all situations.
Theorem 2 Given two finite sequences x=(x 1 , x 2 ) and y=(y 1 , y 2 ), x and y are in ascending order. there exists: 
Proof There are 4! 2!2! = 6 possibilities for the order of x 1 , x 2 , y 1 , y 2 subject to the restriction that x 1 ≤ x 2 , y 1 ≤ y 2 :
For the first case, let
Every term in the expansion of (a + b) p is in that of (a + b + c) p , and likewise every term in the expansion of (b + c) p is in that of (a + b + c) p . The only term shared by (a + b) p and (b + c) p is b p . Thus,
For the third case, let
Extending Theorem 2 to multiple neighbor degrees, it can be obtained as Theorem 3. 
Proof Call y is , y it where 1 ≤ s < t ≤ n an inverse pair if y is > y it . Any permutation y i can be restored to the ascending order by finite many swaps of inverse pairs in y i (e.g. bubble sort). Note
When two values of an inverse pair y i s , y i t are swapped, we find only x s − y i s and x t − y i t in the expansion of x − y i p are affected. However, the swap will always keep or decrease the value of x − y i p . By Theorem 2 x s < x t and y i s > y i s lead to
Thus, in the process of restoring any permutation of y i to the ascending ordered y, the L p distance will be non-increasing. The minimum L p distance between x and a permutation of y is exactly the L p distance between x and y.
Theorem 3 shows the minimum distance between two degree sequences. In signed graph, the neighbor vertices are divided into two catalogs: one is connected via positive edges and the other is connected via negative edges. So the neighbor degrees also form two degree sequences. To compare the similarity of two vertices in signed graph, the two sequences are calculated according to Theorem 3 respectively. Then, the two distances are summarized together as the final minimal distance between the two vertices.
Achieving k-Anonymity Privacy Protection
The basic idea of k-anonymity is to rank all the other vertices based on the similarity. Without loss of generality, we denote vertex u as a target to be anonymized.
Given the original graph G(V, E) and the vertex u which needs to be k-anonymized, the neighbors' degrees of u form two sequences. We call them as positive degree sequence and negative degree sequence respectively according to their signed links. The k − 1 candidate nodes can be obtained by ranking the distances:
where x + , x − are the positive and negative degree sequences of u's neighbor vertices;
are the positive and negative degree sequences of v i 's neighbor vertices; p is positive integer. Note that the sequences are in ascending order and with the same length. Otherwise, zeros are filled into the shorter sequence to make them the same length.
Thus, we select k − 1 candidate nodes for a given vertex to be anonymized against signed 1*-neighborhood graph attack. For target vertices, the data owner or provider can decide which vertices need k-anonymous protection. Other roles of social networks can be protected using the schemes such as l-diversity [13] . A trivial method of finding out the k − 1 candidate vertex will take a lot of time. Therefore, we adopt a filter mechanism to speed up the selection of k−1 candidate vertices. In the filter mechanism, a top k − 1 list is kept and updated during the selection of top k − 1 candidate vertices for a given vertex to be anonymized. The list keeps top k − 1 the most similar vertices. Here, the similarity between vertices is defined by formula (1). According to formula (1), the list holds the k − 1 vertices with the smallest difference. When comparing with a new vertex, the difference between vertices (according to formula (1)) is obtained by comparing their neighbor degrees in turn. Once their difference exceeds the maximum difference in the list, the vertex is discarded without having to continue calculating their remaining neighbor degrees.
In the following, the degree sequences of these candidate nodes are modified towards the target sequences. Algorithm 1 demonstrates the process of approaching the sequences of target vertex u in a social network G = (V, E). Firstly, the most similar vertex v of target u is selected. It is based on the similarity of Theorem 3. Then, u's neighbor vertices are sorted according to their positive degrees and negative degrees. Note that, it is possible that their lengths are not the same. So zeros are filled into the shorter sequences (Lines 6-7). The following processes are divided as positive similarity and negative similarity.
In k-anonymity scheme, the candidate vertices should be indistinguishable with target vertex, which means they have the same sequences of neighbor degrees. In order to get the same degree sequences, some operations of adding or deleting edges are taken in the process of anonymization. In the following, we use u and v as example target vertex and candidate vertex respectively. If the degree of v s neighbor is less than that of u s corresponding neighbor, the neighbor of v should increase its own degree by adding edges. Otherwise, the degree of v s corresponding neighbor is decreased by deleting edges. In order to increase the degree of v s neighbor vertex w, an edge from w to other vertex is added until w meets the requirement of degree sequence, i.e., the degree of w becomes the same with the corresponding degree in u s neighbor degree sequence. When vertex w meets the degree requirements, we set its state as unchangeable. One special case is that the degree in sequence is zero (caused in Line 6 and 7), which means v s degree is smaller than u s degree and some zeroes are filled in v s neighbor degree sequence. In this situation, an edge is added from v to other vertex. Once v s degree and its neighbor degrees meet the requirements of anonymity, we also set v s state as unchangeable. Once a vertex is set as unchangeable, its degree cannot be changed again, which means no edges are permitted to be added to or deleted from this vertex. In signed social graphs, the degree sequences are processed according to their edge signs, i.e., positive degree sequences and negative degree sequences are processed respectively. To decrease the degree of v s neighbor vertex, we delete edges from the neighbor vertex. The method of processing is similar to that of adding edges.
Algorithm 1 shows the processing of anonymizing for a given vertex u. Its time complexity is O(k * n 2 ), where k is the strength of anonymity and n is the degree of vertex. For N given target vertex, the time complexity is O(N * k * n 2 ). The space complexity is O(n), where n is the degree of vertex.
Experiments
We conducted experiments on two real world data set and a synthetic data set. Two real world datasets are used in the experiments [14] . Facebook data graph is with 4039 vertices and 88,234 edges; Wiki data graph is with 7115 vertices and 103,689 edges. We generate a synthetic data set with 10,000 vertices and 179,407 edges using power-law degree distribution model. In social networks, there are usually some key entities which require stricter privacy protection. In this experiment, the numbers of key entities is set as 100.
We evaluate the proposed scheme from two aspects. Firstly, we evaluate the cost of the k-anonymity scheme, which is demonstrated using the numbers of modified edges. Then, we show the evaluation results of utility metrics such as vertex degree and closeness distribution for different k-anonymity.
Modified Edges
In social networks, there are usually some key entities which require stricter privacy protection. When applying the proposed scheme of this paper, the key entities can be provided by data owner or obtained according to vertices' H-index values or paperank values. This paper focuses on k-anonymity scheme for given key entities, not the methods how to decide key entities. Figure 4 demonstrates the number of modified edges on three data sets. There are two trends in these figures. (i) the numbers of modified edges increase with the rise of anonymization strength parameter k. In k-anonymity privacy protection, attackers cannot re-identify the target with confidence higher than 1/k. A larger k means stronger protection, but also indicates larger number of modified edges. (ii) the numbers of modified edges are consistently in growth as the numbers of key entities (N = 100, 200, 300 and 400, respectively) to be k-anonymized increases.
We evaluated the degree distribution of the social graphs. Figure 5a -c show the results of degree distribution on the three datasets (Facebook, Wiki and synthetic dataset respectively). It can be seen from these figures that the degree distributions of modified graphs with different anonymization strength (k=5, 10, 15, 20 and 25) are close to the degree distribution of original graph.
Utility
Utility of oursourced data measures information loss and distortion in the anonymization process. The more information that is lost or distorted, the less useful published data is. We evaluate two metrics about the utility of modified graphs, i.e., vertex degree and closeness. For each metric, we shows not only the detail distributions of original graphs and modified graphs, but also the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test results to check the change quantitatively. To compare how well graph utility is preserved by our approach, we show the degree distributions of facebook, wiki and synthetic data se in Fig. 5a -c respectively. There are some changes for different anonymization strength (k = 5, 10, 15, 20 and 25) compared with original graph. But the trends are all the same. Figure 5d shows the K-S statistic values, which are very low and means that the assumption can be accepted that the graphs are almost the same.
The closeness of a vertex is the average length of the shortest path between the vertex and every other vertex in the graph:
where d(w, v) is the length of shortest path between vertex w and v, and n is the number of vertices in the graph. The greater the closeness of the vertex is, the more central the vertex is positioned in the graph. It is also a good metric to compare two graphs. Figure 6 shows the distributions of closeness of three data sets. These distributions are very similar regardless of different anonymization parameter k. In Fig. 6b , c, Wiki and synthetic data sets has almost overlap distributions. The K-S test results also show the similarity of modified graphs to original graphs.
Related Work
Recent studies propose vertex anonymization methods to protect vertex identities against vertex deanonymization attack. Most privacy measurement employed in these methods are inspired by the k-anonymity concept. As applied to the graph data, the k-anonymity privacy measure varies in terms of graph features the adversary may use to re-identify vertices such as neighborhood graph [15] .
Based on neighborhood graph, previous researcher proposed 1-neighborhood graph [9] , 1*-neighborhood graph [10] and weighted 1*-neighborhood graph [16] in succession. Zhou and Pei [9] attack and to protect the private information [9] . Wang et al. proposed a modification to the 1-neighborhood attack [10] . They assume that attackers have the knowledge of 1*-neighborhood graph. 1*-neighborhood graph is defined as G * u = (G u , D u ) , where G u is the 1-neighborhood graph of node u, and D u is a sequence of degree of u's neighbors. 1*-neighborhood attack means an attacker is assumed to know the exact degree sequence of a target's one-hop neighbors, in addition to the structure of the 1-neighborhood graph. With this assumption, the attacker may re-identify the target from a k-anonymity social network with a probability higher than 1/k. Then, a probabilistic anonymization method is proposed against 1*-neighborhood attack in [10] . Recently, a weighted 1*-neighborhood graph attack was proposed in [16] . They further assume that attackers know not only the 1*-neighborhood graph of a target node, but also the weight on edges. However, some of these assumptions are too strict, which introduces very high cost in network modification, and might even lead to failure of k-anonymity. By editing edges, some other methods are also proposed recently. For example, a k-degree-l-diversity model was proposed in [17] and a privacy protection scheme for non labeled simple graphs was proposed in [18] . For big datasets, some distributed and scalable solutions are also proposed to speed up the process [19, 20] . For example, Zhang et al. [19] proposed a scalable two-phase top-down specialization approach to anonymize large-scale data sets using the MapReduce framework on cloud.
It can be seen that, previous research about graph structure based privacy protection mainly focused on the social graph without signed links. Therefore, it is very urgent to take the singed graph into account for the privacy protection of social networks.
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the problem of privacy protection of social networks. We identify a deanonymization attack named signed 1*-neighborhood graph attack. To resist this kind of attack, we propose an efficient k-anonymity scheme. The proposed scheme achieves k-anonymity protection for key entities. The experimental results indicate that the anonymized graphs are all with very small modification and conserves considerable utility of original social networks.
